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Welfare benefits and labour supply: a 
review of the empirical evidence 
Peter Brosnan, Moira Wilson and Dio Wong* 
Assertions about the impact of welfare benefits on labour supply have often been made 
in claims that the New Zealand benefit system is in need of reform. This paper provides a 
review of empirical evidence of the relationship between labour supply decisions and the 
level, duration and eligibility requirements of unemployment benefits and income support 
provisions such as the Domestic Purposes Benefit. No clear cut conclusions emerge from 
the literature. In general the empirical/ink between disincentives to work in the benefit 
system and actual work behaviour is either insignificant or not substantial in terms of 
total labour supply. 
Introduction 
In the drive to achieve a more efficient "restructured" economy and to lower inflation, 
the current government has consciously allowed the number of unemployed to rise, and 
has deliberately sought to drive down real wages and increase the number of workers 
receiving low pay. Yet at the same time there is pressure to dismantle or reduce welfare 
provisions for those who are unemployed or in need of income support. The reasoning is 
that state provision for these people reduces their incentive to provide for themselves; the 
"unemployment trap", or alternately the "poverty trap" is sprung. Beneficiaries, it is 
argued, are caught in unemployment or in low income by financial incentives to not 
work. As a result labour supply in the economy falls to sub-optimal levels and the drain 
on the state budget becomes intolerable. In its most extreme form, this analysis lays the 
responsibility for unemployment at the door of social welfare benefits which make 
idleness attractive in comparison to work. 
In a recently released policy proposal, the New Zealand Business Roundtable asserts 
that: "Labour market and income support reforms are linked" (New Zealand Business 
Roundtable, 1988). The Roundtable attributes unemployment to rigidity in the structure 
of wages, and to disincentives brought about by the interplay between benefits, the 
minimum wage, and family support provisions. It recommends that the Unemployment 
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Benefit is allowed to fall in relation to wages and is limited to a maximum of 60 or 70 
percent of previous earnings. In addition, the Roundtable proposes lowering the income 
level at which the benefit is withdrawn and raising the rate of its withdrawal. 
Roger Douglas, the recently deposed Minister of Finance, endorsed moves to reform 
the benefit system and called for a "meaningful gap" between the incomes of those on 
wages and those not employed to give the unemployed incentive to work (Evening Post 
5.12.87). Opposition MP and spokesperson for finance, Ruth Richardson, also adheres to 
the view that disincentives for self provision in the current system should be reduced: 
Growing dependency is ensured for the lifetime sometimes of groups, individuals 
and families because the tax rate at the margin when earned income replaces state 
benefits ... is so steep that it provides no incentive to forego state benefits for 
the earned income and thus to get off the treadmill (Address to Wellington 
Women Lawyers, 27 October 1988). 
In particular she assails the Domestic Purposes Benefit for providing incentives to welfare 
dependence: 
... people who sleep around careless of the consequences impose substantial costs 
leaving others to pick up the tab. We can't afford the human and financial costs 
of this sort of behaviour, yet we run ... welfare systems that "pay" people to 
behave in that way (address to the National Party Conference, 6 August 1988). 
Underlying this apparently pervasive view of the need for reform is the assumption 
that labour supply is a function of benefit provision. Benefits are held to present 
disincentives which individuals act upon - it is assumed that benefits reduce labour supply. 
The purpose of this paper is to explore the empirical basis for this assumption. We 
review empirical studies conducted in New Zealand and overseas which test the strength of 
the relationship between benefits and labour supply. Clearly a host of social, economic, 
cultural and institutional factors shape and constrain any individual's decisions about how 
much labour to supply, but what do we really know about the relationship between 
benefits and labour supply? What weight, if any, do individuals give to the alleged 
financial incentives and disincentives of social welfare provision? If individuals do 
respond, how large is the response? Are there other factors to consider? How do different 
types of individuals respond? And which aspects of benefit provision do individuals 
respond to? These are important questions in policy design. 
If individuals do not act on supposed disincentives to work, a basic contradiction in 
government policy is revealed. Policies to restructure the economy and to lower inflation 
have increased the need for unemployment assistance and income support. In removing 
provision or reducing the terms of assistance in the name of labour supply, government 
would be abdicating responsibility for the consequences of its actions. 
What is labour supply ? 
At the outset we need a definition of labour supply. Freeman (1979) conceptualises 
labour supply as comprising six elements which, taken together, define the total supply of 
paid human labour. They are: 
(1) The size and composition of the population; 
(2) The proportion of the population willing to work; 
(3) The number of hours worked each week; 
(4) The number of weeks worked compared to those spent out of paid employment, or 
on vacations or holidays; 
(5) The intensity of work effort; and 
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(6) The education and training of the work force. 
Social security programmes can, at least in the long run, impact on all of these 
elements. Empirical studies, however, tend to concentrate on only two dimensions of 
labour ~upply: !he first dimension is the second element above- the proportion of the 
populatiOn wtllmg to work, usually termed the participation rate. Labour market 
p~cipants ~e empl?yers, the self-employed, wage and salary earners, relatives assisting 
without pay m a busmess, and the unemployed, who are willing to work, and thus in the 
labour force, but unable to find employment. The decision as to whether to be in or out 
of ~e I~J:our force, particularly. in the case of the unemployed, may be conditioned by the 
avrulabihty and nature of benefit provision. 
The second dimension is a combination of the third and fourth elements above - the 
number of hour~ worked each week and the number of weeks worked compared to those 
spent out of paid employment, or on vacations or holidays. This measure of labour 
supply is usually referred to in the literature reviewed as "work effort". We will call it 
work activity. t? av_oid .confusio.n with the intensity of work ((5) above). Work activity 
refers to partiCipation m work Itself, as opposed to participation in the labour force. It 
reflects the propensity of unemployed persons to enter employment, and the hours of work 
supplied by those in employment. Again, such decisions may be conditioned by the level 
and nature of social security provisions. While the participation rate is a measure of 
potential labour supply, work activity relates to actual labour supply. 
Methods of analysis 
Empirical studies generally seek to establish a relationship between the existence and 
~ize of benefits and these two dimensions of labour supply. The key explanatory variable 
IS usually the replacement rate - the extent to which the benefit compensates for lost or 
potential market wages. It is believed that people have an idea of the wage they are 
prepared to wor~ for- they hav~ a "reserv~tion wage" below which they will not supply 
their labour. It IS argued that higher benefit.replacement rates raise people's reservation 
wages. In this way, it is hypothesised, more generous levels of benefit provision reduce 
labour supply and induce greater dependency on social welfare provision. In addition it is 
hypothesised that high effective marginal tax rates imposed by the abatement of be~efits 
with increasing income reduce work acitivity. Five main methods of analysis are used: 
(1) Surveys of beneficiaries. These ask contingency questions of benefit recipients, i.e. 
questions such as: "if you were to receive $X unemployment relief would you 
~emain unemployed?" The results of this kind of research have often proved 
mnaccurate and inconclusive and are considered less reliable than more sophisticated 
econometric work. 
(2) Time-series analyses. These use regression analysis of aggregate economic data to 
establish a relationship between indices of labour supply and changes in benefit 
provision over time. The problem with this type of study is that it proves difficult 
to control adequately for changes in general economic conditions and changes in the 
labour market which also impact on labour supply decisions. 
(3) Cross-sectional studies. These are similar to time series analyses but usually take 
account of more variables. Predictive econometric models are constructed from 
examining patterns in participation and work activity across a sample of individuals 
with different benefit entitlements. The better studies also take account of the 
influence of factors such as health, age, sex, occupation, labour market conditions 
and potential wages. 
(4) Longitudinal studies. These improve on cross-sectional studies by examining the 
same sample of individuals over time. 
(5) Experimentation. This final, most expensive method, is the least used. 
Experimental studies provide different benefit levels to a subject group and to a 
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control group of beneficiaries and analyse subsequent variations in labour supply 
decisions. 
Research has tended to become very mathematical and heavily reliant on the results of 
regression analysis and other statistical procedures. Any statistical e~a'"?ination of ~ta 
can only identify relationships of correlation. Results do not necessanly Imply causality, 
although they are usually suggestive of such. Inevitably, the ~uestion ~ses. as to whe.ther 
such "mathematization" of what is essentially human and soctal behaviOur Is appropnate. 
The interaction between work disincentives of benefit programmes and other non-
economic determinants of labour supply is complex. Studies control for other mediating 
factors to varying degrees but more qualitative determinants of labour supply tend to be 
neglected in any quantitative analysis. The simplifying assumptions .• and arbitrary (and 
often inaccurate) specification of variables required abstract from reality to the exte~t that 
the results of analysis often cannot be applied realistically. Furthermore, aggr~gatt~n of 
individual observations for the purpose of analysis loses the essence of the relatiOnship on 
an individual level. There is also a need for caution in viewing the results of studies 
which use reported labour market data. Louis et al. (1986) found a discrepancy of up to 20 
percent when they compared survey data with data ~at ha~ ret:n independently followed up 
and checked. They suggested that this arose from distortiOns m the accuracy of responses, 
induced by financial incentives associated with false declaration. 
In addition to the methodological problems of each individual study, results must be 
qualified by consideration of the efficacy of the key explanatory variable, the r~placement 
rate of benefits to previous or potential income. Hillier (1985) notes that giVen a pre-
existent replacement rate, an increase in benefits proportional to a rise in earnin~s wou~d 
leave the rate unchanged, but it is likely that individual ~references and behavt~mr w~ll 
have varied. Hillier suggests including earnings and benefit levels as separate vanables m 
any analysis. Harrison and Hart (1983) claim the relevant variable is the nominal gap 
between earnings and the benefit. But again it is possib~e. for individual be~avi~mr to 
change while the earnings gap remains constant. Addt~IOnal problems .arise I~ t~e 
specification of the replacement rate. Aggregate data requrres some av.eragm~ whtch IS 
problematic if not all individuals receive the same benefit level. The studies revi~wed tend 
to use a measure of average income for the earnings term, not representative of the 
unemployed who are mainly unskilled and low to mi?dle i.ncome earners. <;ro~s. sectional 
data provides a fairly accurate measure of the benefit entitlement of each m~tvidual, but 
potential earnings were often imputed from limited information such as the mdustry the 
individual had left when becoming unemployed. 
These qualifications must be borne in mind when interpreting the results of empirical 
work. In this paper we review findings on the relationship between first, unemployment 
benefits and labour supply, and second, various forms of family income support, 
particularly provision for single parent families, and labour supply. 
Unemployment benefits and labour supply 
Underscoring recent empirical economic interest in the effe~ts of unemploy~ent 
benefits on the labour market is a fear that unemployment assistance causes higher 
unemployment than would otherwise be the case. According to orthodox economic 
theory, as we understand it, unemployment benefits have three possible effects on labour 
supply. 
Work disincentive effects: . 
(1) The level of unemployment may increase if unemployed workers fall mto the 
"unemployment trap"; workers may be induced to leave employment, and may have 
no incentive to re-enter employment if they perceive the gains to be made from 
returning to employment as insufficient to offset loss of the unemployment 
(2) 
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assis~ce, as well as additional costs of transporting themselves to and from work, 
clothmg themselves for work, and losing leisure time. 
The exi~ten.c~ and lev~l of benefits may also cause the duration of unemployment 
for any mdivtdual to mcrease. Without the financial incentive to return to work 
immediately, unemployed workers may choose to adopt more leisure time or spend 
more time searching for the right job rather than accepting the frrst offer. 
The entitlement effect: 
(3) In the United Kingdom, United States and Canada, eligibility and entitlement are 
lar.gely determined by contributions to the social security system when in previous 
paid employme~t. In the~e countries, work disincentive effects may to some extent 
be offset by an mcrease 111 the number of people participating in the labour force 
or in.dividuals increasing their work activity in order to meet minimum eligibilit; 
requrrements for unemployment relief and to increase the size of their entitlement. 
In N~w Zealand, to be eligible for the Unemployment Benefit, applicants must be 
seekmg work. Labour market participation, or potential labour supply, may be 
greater than otherwise; as a result of benefit provision non-participants may be 
induced to declare themselves in the labour force. 
E~pirical inve~tigati~ns are grouped in this section according to the relationship each 
exam~nes; the studies reviewed seek to ascertain the relationship between unemployment 
ben~f~ts ~nd (a) the rate of unemployment, (b) the duration of unemployment, or (c) the 
parttctpatton rate. 
(a) The rate of unemployment 
A number of studies use time-series analysis to examine the relationship between the 
lev~l of ~nefits relative to average income, and the aggregate unemployment rate. In the 
l!mted Kmgdom, both the replacement rate and the unemployment rate have increased 
smce 1948, which p~ov_ided support, in early studies, for the hypothesis that higher 
unemployment benefi~ mduce unemployment. But in the 1970s the relationship broke 
down; unemployment mcreased at an unprecedented rate while the replacement rate tended 
to fall. Further doubt was cast on the results of earlier studies when it was found that the 
outco'"?e of time series analyses was sensitive to replacement rate specification; the choice 
of vartables representing the level of benefits and measuring average income affected 
results (Hemming 1984, p.110). 
G~egory and Paterson. (1983) undertook the first Australian study of this kind. 
Workmg on data for the penod 1970-1979 they found a significant association between the 
level of benefit provision and the number of benefit recipients. Rather than raising the 
total number of unemployed, however, the increase in the number of beneficiaries 
prima!ily occurre~ ~ecause of an increased propensity of the unemployed to take up 
benefits. Recogmsmg that the measured impact of benefit levels shrank as a greater 
number of other explana~ory variables were included in their regression, Gregory and 
P~te~son concluded that m general, the response to benefit payment changes occurred 
~It~m the total unemployment pool. The importance of other variables, particularly 
mdtcators ~f l~bour der:nand and .other labour market conditions, is illustrated by the fact 
that the maJor mcrease m Australian unemployment in 1982-83 occurred when the ratio of 
benefits to average weekly earnings was falling (Social Security Review (SSR) Issues 
Paper No.4). 
Of the three relevant studies of unemployment in New Zealand (Braae, 1978; Hicks, 
1984; Hyslop, 1987), two use the time-series approach. Braae (1978) tested the 
?ypothesis of American economists Grubel and Maki (1976) that a rising replacement rate 
mduces unemployment. Controlling for changes in the state of the economy, changes in 
labour supply (such as the increased participation of women) and the introduction of 
government work schemes and administrative changes, Braae found a positive relationship 
between the unemployment rate and replacement rate. This, however, was only 
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statistically significantly different from zero in one of the tests used, and likely to be 
biased in the other. Furthermore, the period under consideration by Braae was 1954-55 to 
1.972-73, when unemployment was low - much lower than the consistently high rates of 
unemployment in the mid to late 1970s and 1980s. 
A second study was presented in Hicks' (1984) PhD thesis. Hicks tested the same 
hypothesis but considered the period 1960-81, controlled for more variable~ and impro~ed 
on Braae's specification of the replacement rate. Braae had used the ratio of ~ mamed 
person's benefit to average weekly earnings but most of the unemployed were smgle~ To 
correct for this, Hicks used the single person's rate. Hicks' results directly contradicted 
Braae's findings and ran counter to the outcome of Grubel and Maki's study of 
unemployment in the United States. Several reasons for the insensitivity of 
unemployment in New Zealand to changes in benefit levels were suggested. In contras~ to 
the United States, New Zealand has a flat-rate system of unemployment compensation 
where the size of the benefit is not related to previous earnings or contributions. The 
effective replacement rate facing each individual is much lower and provides less 
inducement to leave unemployed and stay unemployed than in the United States. New 
Zealanders do not contribute directly to a social security fund and because there is no 
qualifying period of employment or minimum level of c~ntrib~tions, ~e benefi~ is seen 
as a handout, not compensation as of right. As such It cames a stigma whtch may 
discourage workers from quitting employment even when benefit levels rise, and may 
discourage the involuntarily unemployed from claiming b~nefits to whic~ ~h~~ m:e 
entitled. Finally, coverage in New Zealand is limited by the mcome test. Ehgtbthty IS 
determined on the basis of the income of both the claimant and their spouse, which 
effectively excludes most married women as they tend to be secondary income ~er~ with 
lower market wages than men. Studies reviewed below indicate that women, m parttcul~ 
married women, have the most sensitive labour supply response to changes m benefit 
levels. Therefore those whose registered unemployment rate might react most to changes 
in the Unemployment Benefit are largely excluded from receiving the benefit in New 
Zealand. 
A further set of studies use cross-sectional analysis to relate the probability of being 
unemployed to the replacement rate. Minford (1983) claims a strong rela~ionship for ~he 
UK and predicts that a 1 percent increase in the level of unemployment assistance, holdmg 
wages constant, will increase the unemployment rat~ by 2.~-4.0 percent. He rec~mmends 
cuts in the Unemployment Benefit which, he predicts, will lower the reservation wage 
below which unemployed workers are unwilling to supply their labour, and reduce 
unemployment in the UK by up to 1.7 million. His method and results are severely 
criticised by Nickell (1984), and Layard and Nickell (1986) find a much smaller 
relationship which explains only 0.4 percentage points of the rise in unemployment since 
the late 1950s. Atkinson and Micklewright (1985) survey several British studi~s of the 
relationship between Unemployment Benefit rates and incentives to work and conclude 
that there is no firm evidence of a measurably large disincentive effect. 
The most recent and thorough empirical work on British unemployment provision is 
by Beenstock eta/. (1987). They used 1978 and 1981 Family Expenditure Survey data, 
and controlled for variables such as the age of the household head, the number of 
dependents, whether the family had a mortgage or not, the level of household income if 
the head were unemployed, and the industry unemployment rate for the head. Beenstock et 
a/ . found that the probability of being unemployed is not greatly influenced by the level 
of benefits, and concluded that, at household level, labour supply incentives and 
disincentives of the tax benefit system do not affect labour supply decisions. They 
suggested that other factors such as demand for labour and social pressure to work, have a 
stronger influence. 
Indeed a study of the Canadian labour market by Osberg eta/. (1986) demonstrates that 
if demand side influences are controlled for on an individual basis, the generosity of the 
Unemployment Insurance system is not a statistically significant determinant of the 
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probability of being unemployed. Osberg eta/. analysed a data set that matched individual 
em~lor~e characteristics ~~th detailed information about their respeetive employers. The 
vanabthty of sales and htnng .costs of a worker's employers were more important than 
Unemployment Insurance entitlements in determining his or her probability of being 
unemployed. 
(b) The duration of unemployment 
Most studies of ~e rela~ionship betwee~ unemployment provision and labour supply 
are c~ncemed no~ wtth. the Impact of benefits on the flow of labour into unemployment, bu~ With the relatiOnsh_IP between. benefits and the flow of labour out of unemployment. 
It Is usually. hypot~estzed that htgher replacement rates for unemployment assistance 
reduce the mcenttve to return to work, which lowers the probability of leaving 
unemployment and extends the duration of unemployment spells. Concern about the cost 
of such b~haviour ?as stimulated substantial research interest. Reviewing research 
conducted m the Umted S~tes. up to th~ mid 1970s, Hamermesh (1977) estimated that in gene~al a 10 percentage pomt mcrease m the replacement rate leads to an increase in the 
dura~on of unemployment of about h~f a week on average when labour markets are tight. 
Danztger et al. (198~). makes a guestimate from Hamermesh's synthesis that Unemploy-
ment Insuran~eyrovtston as a whole extends the duration of unemployment by about five 
weeks per rectptent. 
Moffit (19~5) has estimated that, for males, a 10 percent increase in Unemployment Insur~nc~ entitlement extends the duration of unemployment by about one day. 
Termm~t10ns. of unemployment spells were observed to cluster around the benefit 
ex?austton pomt. Hamermesh (1979, 1980) and Burgess and Kingston (1981) also find 
evtdence that the duration of benefit eligibility impacts on the length of unemployment. 
Indeed, on a cross-country comparison, Layard (1986) observed that countries with 
indefinite duration of eligibility for unemployment assistance have more long-term 
unemployment th.an . those that have an upper limit on duration. It must be recognised, 
h? wever, th.at thts Is largely a re~ection of varying benefit structures, not of great 
differences m labour supply behaviOur. In many OECD countries, and in the United 
States, longer term unemployed ~or whom Unemployment Insurance eligibility has been 
exhausted tend to be transferred mto work schemes or onto other benefits. This has less rele~ance in New. ~ealand. s~nce the Unemployment Benefit may continue indefinitely 
provtded the beneficiary satisfies certain requirements. 
In .Britain, Narandranathan et al. (1985) found that the effect of the Unemployment 
Benef•.t on unemployment duration is significantly different from zero. The size of the 
effect IS most pronounced ~ong teenage males and falls with increasing age. For long 
term unemployed t~e effect IS reduced, an~ is only significant for teenage males. They 
found no stro~g evtdence to support the vtew that the effect of benefits on duration is 
related to the stze of the replacement rate for different individuals. 
'Y~Y ~e labour. supply behaviour of teenagers is the most sensitive to benefit 
~ro~tston IS a questt?n of some d!ssent in the literature. Nickell (1979) interprets his 
fmdmgs along.these hnes as reflecting a lack of job offers received by teenagers. Minford 
(1983) arg?es mstea~ th.at the reservation wage below which teenagers are not prepared to suppl~ their labo~r Is h_Igher than the wage typically offered to them by employers. But 
for thts. to hold m Mmford's own study, most individuals would have to maintain 
reservation ~ages above th~ maximum wage offer in his sample, which is unlikely - 50 
percent of hts sample received benefits less than half of the average after tax wage, 
comparable to the mcome of the lowest paid 10 percent of manual workers and below 
average ~ings ~or British teenagers_. Hunte~ eta/. (1986) report that, in fact, British 
teenagers reservation wages are more hkely to he below the mean of likely job offers. 
In general, the effect of unemployment assistance on unemployment duration is rather 
modest and, with the ~xception of Narandranathan eta/. (1985), the statistical significance· 
of results can be vtewed as not particularly impressive (Atkinson, 1987, p.863). 
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Atkinson et al. (1984) challenge even this limited empirical conclu~ion by de~onst:at_ing 
that the size of the effect is sensitive to the method and the assumptions used m statistical 
analysis. By changing the benefit variables used, the ~pecifi~tio~ of the replaceme~t ~te, 
the choice of time period, and by including or excludmg family crrcumstances and ~ndices 
of need, they proved that it is possible for the same data set to produce findmgs ?f 
significant effects on unemployment dur~tion, or, altema~ly, no effect. . Ther~ Is,; 
therefore, "substantial scope for the conclusmns drawn to be mfluenced by pnor behefs 
(Atkinson et al., 1984, p.25). Furthermore, Osberg et al. (1986) have ~emonstra~~ that 
the duration of an individual's unemployment spell, as well as theu probabthty ~f 
becoming unemployed, is not affected by the lev~l of Un~mploymen~ Insurance tf 
variables which reflect the demand for their labour are mcluded m the analysts. . 
Findings on the impact of unemployment provision on the probabilit~ of l_eavmg 
unemployment are contradictory. In theory a hi~~ replacement rate w~ll ~aise the 
reservation wage of unemployment assistance rect~Ients and lower t?e hkehhood of 
leaving unemployment. Blau and Robins (1986b) clrum t~a~ the r_eservatio~ wage and the 
rate of job acceptance for Unemployment Insurance rectptents I~ ~e Umted States are 
significantly different from those for unemployed who are non-recipients. Of a sample of 
married men and women who experienced at least one unemployment spell between 
January 1979 and October 1980, they found that with a benefit level that repla~e~ 50 
percent of previous wages, the reservation wage of _Unemployment Insurance recipients 
was 11 percent higher for males and 9 percent htgher for females ~h~n that of non-
recipients. The rate of job acceptance for Unemployme?t.Insurance recipients was lo~er, 
and remained lower over a longer spell, than for non-recipients. Howeve~, methodol?gical 
deficiencies mean that double counting of job offers may have occurred m construction of 
the data. Narandranathan et al. (1985) found that changes in benefit levels have no i~pact 
on the probability of British long term unemployed leavi?g unemployment,_ except m the 
case of teenagers. Nickell (1979) also found no evidence that benefits effect the 
probability of leaving unemployment. . . 
The limited empirical evidence available for New Zealand IS concern~d with the 
duration of unemployment, not the probability of leaving unemployment. Htcks ~1984_), 
in addition to examining determinants of the unemployment rate, looked for a relatio~s?IP 
between the replacement rate and unemployment duration. He found. a po_sitive 
relationship between the level of unemployment benefit payments and duration - It was 
estimated that a 10 percent increase in the replacement rate wo~ld ext~nd the a~era~e 
unemployment spell by just over a week and a half. Hicks reconclles this result with ~Is 
finding that higher replacement rates do not raise aggregate unemployment by suggestmg 
that unemployed workers are encouraged to search for longer to fi~d a better ~ob w~ich 
offers them greater job security, and from which they are less hkely to qmt. Htcks 
concluded that benefit increases in New Zealand do not induce workers to quit employment 
so as to enjoy more leisure or a subsidized job search, but lead to an increase in ·search 
time taken by those already unemployed, which is beneficial in the long run because 
reduced turnover of labour reduces frictional unemployment, and lowers the unemployment 
rate. A more recent study of unemployment duration in New Zealand by ~yslop ~1987) 
uses micro data from the Department of Social Welfare database for the penod Apnl1981 
- March 1985. Again a positive relationship between th~ replac_e~ent_ rate and 
unemployment duration was found. Overall, however, unexplamed vanation m ~e data 
led both Hicks and Hyslop to conclude that this relationship did no~ _constitute ,a 
satisfactory explanation of unemployment duration in New Zealand. In addition, Hyslop s 
results were for a sample of unemployment beneficiaries who resumed employme~t on 
leaving the register and thus ipso facto, were those unemployed who were the mos~ likely 
to fit the work disincentive and extended job search model. Some of those leavmg the 
register do not resume employment but withdraw from the labour force. We now turn to 
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the ~~piri~al evidence on the impact of unemployment assistance on the decision to 
participate m the labour force or to withdraw from participation. 
(c) Labour force participation 
~ost of the studies reviewed so fCU: ~ssume that any increase in unemployment 
duration ?Ccur~ at the expense ~f work activity; the general conclusion is that any fmdings 
o~ ~ relatt~nship between benefit levels and unemployment illustrate the operation of work 
dzs~nce_ntzve effects. _B~t work disincentive effects apply only when someone who 
ordmanly would work IS mduced to remain unemployed. Some proportion of unemployed 
peopl~, however, choose between unemployment and non-participation in the labour force 
The _lmk ?etween unemplo~ment duration and labour supply is not clear; a positiv~ 
relatton~hip between benefit levels and unemployment duration does not provide an 
appropnate measure of work disincentive effects because entitlement effects are also at 
work (Capen et al., 1985). 
_Solon (1979) suggests four ways in which entitlement effects of unemployment 
asst~tance _on labour fo~ce. p~ticipation can operate. They are: (1) by encouraging 
con~nued JOb sea:ch by mdtvidual~ who would otherwise become discouraged and quit 
lookmg for work, _(2) by en~ouragmg workers who are not really interested in work to 
pretend to ~ ~ekmg wo!k, m order to collect benefits; (3) by inducing individuals who 
would be dismterested m work to seriously conduct job search in accordance with 
Une_mploym_ent Insurance regulations; and (4) by inducing people who would be non-
p~ICipants m the labour force to accept seasonal or temporary jobs in order to raise their 
entitlement. 
So~on used data from a New York State Department of Labour Survey to examine the 
be~a~mur of Unemp~oyment Insurance claimants. Analysis of the number of weeks 
recipients spent both m and out of employment and in and out of the work force showed 
that ~xtendmg Unemployment Insurance eligibility for one week raised unemployment 
duration ~y about on~ da~ ?n average. But it was estimated that two thirds of this increase 
was attnbutable to ~ndividuals choosing to delay leaving the work force. Extended 
unemployment dura~t~n occurred more at the expense of non-participation than at the 
expense of work activity. However, the focus period of the study was only six months 
and m~y not ~ave been long enough to obtain reliable results. In addition, the sample 
composed claimants who had exhausted regular benefits and was not representative of 
Unemployment Insurance claimants in general. 
_Neverthe~ess, similar findings resulted from a study by Barron and Mellow (1981). 
Usmg ~ natiOnal sample of unemployed workers from the United States Current 
Po~u~atmn Survey, Barron and Mello~ ~stimated that, in any given month, 19 percent of 
recip~ents and 29 percent of non-recipients would find work, and that unemployment 
duration for Unemployment I?s~rance recipients was eight weeks longer than that for non-
Un~mployment ~n~urance _recipients .. But half the differential unemployment duration was 
attnbuted to recipients bemg more hkely than non-recipients to stay in the work force in 
the face of unemployment. 
Responsiveness, in terms of participation, to changes in unemployment assistance is 
g~eatest am_o~g ~omen. Men tend to have a stronger attachment to the labour force with 
higher p~~cip_atmn rates ~nd longer work hours at all ages. Women's participation and 
~o~k act~vity IS more v~table. Hamermesh (1979) examined, in addition to the work 
dismce~tive effect, the entitlement effect for white women aged between 30 and 54. Under 
~e Umted ~tates systems, individuals have the incentive to enter the work force o~ 
~ncrease their work hours to meet the eligibility requirements or raise the level of 
msuran~e to which they are enti~led. Using the Michigan Panel Study of Income 
Dynami~S for 1971, Hamermesh discovered that women acted on these incentives· a 20 pe~cent mcrease in statutory minimum weekly Unemployment Insurance entitleme~t was 
estimated to raise the parti~i~ati~n rate of women by 1.1 percent and annual work time by 
17 hours. Increased partiCipation and work activity from entitlement effects almost 
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exactly offset work disincentive effects. Hamermesh concluded that the net effect of 
Unemployment Insurance benefits on employment of prime age females was small. 
In a second study, Hamermesh (1980) examined sample data for married women aged 
25-54 from the 1970 United States Census. Hamermesh found that increased potential 
duration of benefits and easier eligibility requirements induced a greater average number of 
weeks to be worked by women. Women who worked only part of the year in seasonal or 
temporary work increased their work activity to become eligible for benefits the rest of the 
year. Women responded primarily to the terms of eligibility . The level of benefits had 
only a slight effect on labour supply behaviour. . 
New Zealanders with benefit entitlement (i.e. single people and persons without a 
primary income earner spouse) need only register as being unemployed and seeking work 
to qualify for the Unemployment Benefit. This provides incentive for non-participants to 
declare themselves in the labour force. Conversely, just as a proportion of unemployment 
beneficiaries may be disguised non-labour market participants, many women outside the 
workforce may represent disguised unemployed because they have no incentive to register 
as labour market participants out of work. The Household Labour Force Survey reports 
that the numbers in this latter category are substantial (Household Labour Force Survey; 
Table 6.2). Similarly administrative procedures for other benefits impact upon the 
measured incidence of unemployment and non-participation. Brosnan (1987) argues that 
much of the increase in usage of the Invalid's Benefit in New Zealand since the early 
1970s represents a disguised increase in unemployment. Disabled workers are at the end 
of the queue for jobs in order of increasing disability. Rising unemployment means that 
even those with minor disabilities have difficulties finding work. Of the assistance 
options for disabled unemployed, the Invalids Benefit is more attractive financially than 
the Unemployment Benefit and is less subject to medical review than the Sickness 
Benefit. In addition, a change in administrative policy to transfer long term unemployed 
off the Unemployment Benefit in 1972-73 marked the·beginning of a steep upward trend 
in Invalid's Benefit numbers which has continued throughout the 1970s and 1980s with 
worsening unemployment. 
In Australia too, despite incentives for non-participants to disguise themselves as 
unemployed in order to collect the Unemployment Benefit, it would appear that a much 
greater problem is disguised unemployment. Stricker and Sheehan (1981) compared recent 
changes in participation rates with the long run trend and estimated that recorded 
unemployment of 374 000 in 1980 was cushioned by the withdrawal of 340 000 hidden 
unemployed from the labour force, mainly males over 55 and married women. The 
implication for the welfare budget was, therefore, not limited to a rise in demand for 
unemployment assistance. The recession also induced rises in usage of service, invalid 
and age pensions, and to a lesser extent the Widows Pension and Supporting Parents 
Benefit. The low level of the Unemployment Benefit relative to these alternative forms of 
income support, and the general ineligibility of married women for unemployment relief 
had, in this case, the effect of reducing potential labour supply as measured by the 
participation rate. 
(d) Unemployment benefits and labour supply: a summary 
There is no consistent evidence that rising replacement rates of unemployment 
assistance induce more people into unemployment, or raise the probability of being 
unemployed. It is generally found that once in unemployment the existence, level and 
terms of unemployment assistance has an impact on the duration of unemployment spells, 
though there is no conclusive empirical evidence of an impact on the probability of 
leaving unemployment. The effect of benefit provision on unemployment duration is not 
necessarily indicative of substantial labour supply disincentive effects. First, the effect 
found is generally small in relation to total labour supply and its size and significance is 
sensitive to the specification variables and to the inclusion of variables reflecting demand 
side influences. Second, longer duration may facilitate a more extensive job search and 
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re~uce the rate of ~rict~onal unemployment and increase work activity in the long run. 
Thrrd, l.onger duration I~ ~ot necessarily at the expense of work activity. A significant 
proportion of ~ose receivmg unemployment assistance would be non-participants in the 
absence ~f _assista~ce. For these people, the Unemployment Benefit has no impact on 
wor~ ~ctivlty. Fmally, under an unemployment insurance system, unemployment 
pro~Ision can have an offsetting effect of increasing the work activity of those, 
particularly women, who want to become eligible for benefits or raise their entitlement. 
Family income support and labour supply 
. Family in~ome support payments take various forms. They supplement family 
mcome when It falls below a proscribed level. This level is often adjusted relative to 
family status, family _siz~, a~d other indicators of need. Cash income supplements may be 
augmented by benefi~s m k1~d s~ch as food stamps, medical aid and housing subsidies. 
The debate surroundmg family mcome support programmes is concerned with what is 
termed the "poverty trap". There is a fear that, although family income support benefits 
g~nerally do not provid~ for a. standard of living beyond the poverty level, increasing them 
will reduce _further any mcentive for people to work to raise themselves out of poverty. In 
theory .• a high replacer:nent ra~e and high effective marginal tax rates imposed by the 
red_u~tiOn of. support as mcome ·~creases, discourage labour market participation and work 
activity and mduce long-term reliance on benefits. · 
The relation~~ip between the f~rm. of provision and indices of labour supply has only 
been tested empmcally overseas. Fmdmgs of this work are reviewed below. We then turn 
to more suggestive and less empirically conclusive findings for New Zealand and 
Australia. 
(a) Empiricalfindings 
Beenstock et al. (1987) provide an up-to-date and comprehensive investigation of the 
impact of disin_centives i.n the. British ~~-tran~fer system on work activity. They 
construct~ profile~ of the mcent_1ves and dismcenuves faced by different types of worker; 
th~ e~fective_ m~gmal tax rates Imposed by the level of income support and its removal 
With mcreasmg I~Cofiole, together. with the income tax rate, varies with income, housing 
tenure status, family size and family status. They then compared the expected distribution 
of unemployment and work activity that would occur if individuals made rational decisions 
accordin~ l? the incentives they faced, with the actual distribution of unemployment and 
work a~tivity of 7000 ?o~sehold heads sampled in the 1978 and 1981 British Family 
Expenditure Surveys. Fmdmg no clear evidence that people's work patterns are influenced 
by the tax-transfer system, Beenstock et al. concluded that individuals do not, or cannot 
respond to labour supply incentives and disincentives. 
These findings relate .only to household heads who were predominantly male, although 
of the few solo mothers m the 1978 sample, a number chose to work hours which would 
have implied 100 percent effective marginal tax rates. While acknowledging several 
shortco"!ings with. th~ir _analysi_s, 1 Bee~stock et al. raise several important possible 
explan~tions for .theu fmdmgs. First, the mterplay of taxes and benefits, and their impact 
on net mcome, IS COf!Ip_lex. The as~umption that individuals understand and act upon 
them may be unrealistic. Alternatively, other considerations such as social status 
stimulation and self-worth may be more important than financial incentives in decision~ 
Beenstock et al. ( 1987) conceed that they did not control for interactions between 
leisure preferences and family status, housing tenure and earnings. They ignored the 
level of secondary income earner wages and also may have inappropriately imputed 
wage rates for the unemployed. Finally, the Chi-square test has been proved to be a 
blunt statistical instrument. 
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about whether to work and how much to work. Finally, individuals may be unable to 
achieve their desired mix of hours and earnings. The majority of workers have little 
choice over whether or when they work, and are constrained to choosing between 
unemployment or non-participation, and a 40 hour week. 
The main family income support programme in the United States is Aid to Families 
with Dependent Children (AFDC), which guarantees a specified level of assistance to 
families with low or zero income, and proportionately lower benefits as income increases. 
Families headed by solo mothers constitute a large proportion of AFDC recipients, and 
empirical work on family income support is concerned primarily with the labour supply 
response of women. Several studies seek to establish relationships between AFDC 
provision and female labour force participation and work activity. Garfinkel and Orr 
(1974), Williams (1975) and Saks (1975) examined cross-sectional data for female AFDC 
recipients in the late 1960s. In response to a $500 increase in the annual income 
guarantee, Garfinkel and Orr estimated a resultant 2.4 percent reduction in the rate of 
employment of recipients, and Williams and Saks predicted a drop in participation rates of 
recipients of 5.8 percent and 1.7 percent respectively. Raising the rate of benefit 
abatement by 10 percent was predicted by Garfinkel and Orr to lower employment rates by 
1.4 percent, while Williams estimated a 2.1 percent fall in participation rates. The 
direction of the labour supply responses found in these studies is consistent with the 
operation of disincentive effects of the sort predicted by conventional economic theory. 
The size of the effects is not clear but appears small. The effect of changes in eligibility 
was not explored 
Of five studies (Masters and Garfinkel, 1977; Levy, 1979; Barr and Hall, 1981; 
Hausman, 1981; Moffitt, 1980) analysing the economic behaviour of both AFDC 
recipient and non-recipient female heads of families, only one (Masters and Garfinkel, 
1977) failed to find any effect on labour supply. Levy (1979), examined longitudinal 
Panel Study of Income Dynamics (PSID) data from 1968, and found that higher levels of 
guaranteed income reduced the supply of work, but that higher rates of benefit abatement 
actually increased work activity. Barr and Hall (1981), using a measure of welfare 
dependency as a proxy for labour supply, found evidence of work disincentive and 
incentive effects consistent with Levy's results. However Hausman's (1981) analysis of 
the 1975 PSID resulted in the observation of large negative impacts on hours worked from 
both the level of income guarantee and the rate of benefit abatement. He estimated that a 
$1000 increase in the annual income guarantee would reduce the average annual work 
activity of female heads by 120 hours. In a similar study, and using the same data source, 
Moffitt (1980) estimated a response of 90 less hours worked, but found a very weak and 
statistically insignificant impact from the benefit abatement rate.2 Danziger et al. (1981) 
point to methodological weaknesses in both these later studies, and argue that neither of 
the analyses can be regarded as definitive. The only consensus on the effects of AFDC 
provision on female labour supply, is that higher levels of income guarantee reduce work 
activity by some amount. 
Blau and Robins (1986a) examined the impact of AFDC benefits, food stamp benefits 
and general assistance benefits on the labour supply of men, youths and married women, 
as well as single woman household heads. Their study improved on the work of Hausman 
(1981) and Moffit (1980) because it utilised continuous work histories, from the newly 
established Employment Opportunities Pilot Project (EOPP), rather than the discrete 
annual changes in labour market status provided by PSID data. Calculating the differences 
in rates of transition from employment to unemployment, unemployment to 
employment, and to and from the labour force and employment or unemployment, 
disincentive effects were held to exist if differences in transition rates between welfare 
2 Moffitt's (1980) paper was unpublished. The other studies are reviewed in Danziger et 
al. (1981). 
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~ecipient~ and non-welfare recipients implied a reduction in the rate of employment, an 
mcrease m the_ r~te of u~e~~loyme~t, or a decrease in the labour force participation rate 
~or welfare recipients. Significant differences in transition rates for each group were found 
m almo~t .all ca~es. The greatest differentials were for single woman household heads. 
Work. dismcentive effects were found to be associated only with a differential in the 
duratiOn of unemployment and a lower rate of transition from unemployment to 
employment. There was. no signi~icant difference in the propensity to enter spells of 
unet_n~lo~ment and the di~ference. m the rate of transition from unemployment to non-
parttcipatio~ ~as not consistent with the operation of disincentive effects - unemployed 
welfare recipients were less likely to withdraw from the labour force when faced with 
~nemployment than unemployed non-recipients. Blau and Robins found that, while 
mcome support reduced work activity of recipients through extended duration of 
unemployment, there was some increased participation. 
A suggested alternative to income support such as AFDC is a negative income tax 
(NIT). Instead o~ dem~nding taxes and then redistributing income through benefits, this 
operates by makmg direct cash payments to those who earn below a critical income 
thr~sh~ld (New Zealand's Guaranteed Minimum Family Income is of this type). Whilst 
switchmg from AFDC may reduce the high effective tax rate (from benefit abatement as 
well as income tax) on the very poor, NIT payments may require an increase in the tax 
~ate for other workers. Concern about possible work disincentive effects from negative 
mcome taxes led to an unprecedented form of economic research. Between 1968 and 1978 
the United States ~ederal Gov~~ment sponsored four large scale experiments. In each: 
on~ gr~u~ of _Io~ ~ncom~ families acted as a control and remained eligible for welfare, 
while Similar I~dtviduals m a second group were given different income support levels but 
the same effective tax rate of support removal, or the same support levels but different tax 
rates: The o~erall effect of changes in incentives was found to be relatively small. 
Mamed !llen m the experiments reduced their hours of work by between 1 and 7 percent. 
For mamed ~omen th~ change was from a smaller base and the labour supply differentials 
~ere lar¥e with reduc~IOns of between 17 percent and 31 percent. The impact of changes 
m eff~ti.ve tax ra~es, Im~sed by abatement of the NIT payment with increasing income, 
was . limited, while the Impact of the level of NIT support was more substantial 
(Whiteford, 1980). From these experiments, Betson et al. (1982) predict that the labour 
supply response to replacing the existing system with a NIT system would be a 0.4 to 0.8 
percent increase in work acti.vity, ~~ich is. very small in relation to total labour supply. 
They conclude that economic efficiency m terms of labour supply should not weigh 
heavily in the choice of tax transfer systems. 
. Other results of int~rest from the NIT experiments include the findings that search 
time whe~ unem~loyed mcre_ased under NIT support, and in one experiment area (Indiana), 
that t~e birth weight of babies born to NIT families was significantly higher than those 
?om m the contr?l group. In Seattle, providing women with an income guarantee 
mdependent of therr husbands led~ ~n increase in the break-up of families (Stiglitz, 1986, 
p.499). Solo female h~ds of families were only studied in one of the experiments and 
were found to reduce theu hours worked by between 2 and 12 percent, much less than the 
17 to 31 percent reduction in hours worked by married women. Results of the NIT 
expe~ments _sh~u~d be used with caution, however. Stiglitz (1986) notes that the 
behav~our of mdividuals may change if they are subjects of experiments, and that sample 
selection rna~ ~ave been biased with participation in the experiments being voluntary 
only. In addition, responses to short-term changes may be different from reactions to 
permanent changes. Institutional structures, such as the availability of part-time work and 
~e length .of the working week, which condition labour supply responses, would also take 
time to adJust to changes in policy. 
It would appear then that while disincentives may be inherent in income support 
systems, men do not generally act on them. Women do, but the impact of their response 
on total labour supply is small. 
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(b) Indications from New Zealand 
The only statistical testing of the relationship between income support provisions and 
labour supply in New Zealand is a study by Ross (1987) who found that, for married 
women, the probability of participation, but not the number of hours worked, is sensitive 
to the existence and level of household transfer income. Despite the lack of statistical 
testing there is much empirical work available, concerned mainly with the effects of 
income support for female solo parents. The proportion of solo parents in receipt of the 
Widows Benefit and Domestic Purposes Benefit (DPB) in New Zealand has risen from 58 
percent in 1976 to 71 percent in 1984, while the number of solo parent families has 
increased markedly. 
There is a fear that the existence and level of support provided by the DPB in New 
Zealand has contributed to rising rates of marital breakdown and growing numbers of 
single women keeping their children, and that this has, in tum, had implications for 
women's labour supply. Wylie (1980), however, notes that the tendency for single 
mothers to keep their children predates the introduction of the statutory DPB by about five 
years. Further, the DPB is not financially attractive to married women. Beneficiary 
families have depressed standards of living in comparison to two parent families. 
Introduction of the DPB was a response to changing social and economic behaviour, not 
the cause of changes. 
Dominick et al. (1988) found no evidence of a narrowing of the difference between 
wages and benefits to account for the decrease in the rate of employment of solo parents. 
It must be noted, however, that they compare the DPB with the average-ordinary-time 
female wage which is probably not representative of the wage attainable by DPB 
recipients. Their finding was that a stricter benefit income test in 1984 was the main 
cause of the reduced employment rate. Despite relaxation of the allowed earnings disregard 
in 1978, failure to index for inflation has reduced the real value of allowed earnings. They 
also find a relationship between the age of the youngest child and a solo mother's 
employment and argue that opportunity, provided by reasonable access to childcare, is as 
important, if not more important than financial incentives in determining the labour 
supply behaviour of solo mothers. Indeed Shipley (1982), who interviewed a small 
sample of female DPB recipients, noted two main preferences among the women. They 
wanted either (1) a part-time job which would not affect their benefit, or, (2) a full-time 
job well enough paid to cope with the extra costs such as childcare incurred in working 
full-time. Wylie (1980) interviewed female solo parents who were not DPB recipients 
but worked to support themselves and their families. For these women, access to suitable 
and affordable childcare was their biggest difficulty. Most were only able to work because 
friends and relatives would provide childcare at little cost. In Ross's (1987) study of the 
determinants of married women's labour supply the existence of pre-school children, and to 
a lesser extent primary school aged children, were the key explanatory variables. The level 
of transfer income was less important. 
The earnings capacity of women is also important in determining their labour supply 
behaviour. Dominick et al. (1988) suggest that work experience, skills and qualifications 
have a significant impact on the rate of movement off the DPB into employment. 
Shipley (1982) noted that most of her respondents could find no work, or only work that 
would not support them better than the DPB. There is, perhaps, a case for arguing that 
the increase in usage of the DPB is linked to rising unemployment. Faced with 
unemployment, the DPB is more financially attractive than the Unemployment Benefit; 
some proportion of DPB recipients may represent hidden unemployed workers. Causality, 
however, cannot be extended any further than this. Under the Australian system, which is 
reasonably similar to that operating in New Zealand, there is no evidence of a causal link 
between rising unemployment and the increasing rate of ex-nuptial births, or that the 
availability of the Supporting Parent's Benefit influences the decision of teenagers to 
become pregnant (SSR Issues Paper No.3). Pregnancies were unplanned and the decision 
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to mother the child generally reflected the lack of alternative social and economic options 
for teenage girls. 
(c ) Family income support and labour supply: a summary 
There is no evidence that family income support has a discemable adverse impact on 
the labour supply of men. It would appear that the labour supply of married women and 
solo mothe~s is more sensitive to the level and terms of provision, but their response is 
very small m terms of total work activity. There is no consensus on the effect of the rate 
of removal of income support on labour supply. 
Empirical observation in New Zealand suggests no relationship between women's 
labour supply and the level of the DPB, although there is some indication that the small 
size of the earnings disregard has a negative effect on part-time work activity. Increased 
usage of the DPB reflects social change which has contributed to the growth in numbers 
of needy families, and growing unemployment, in the face of which the DPB is the most 
att~active incom_e support alternative. The propensity for unemployed solo parents to 
clatm the_ DPB mstead oft~~ U~employment Benefit has no impact on work activity, 
although It may reduce partiCipation, and reduces the measured incidence of unemploy-
ment. 
Conclusion 
This review of empirical findings on the labour supply effects of social security provision 
finds much continuing empirical debate. There is no consistent evidence that the level of 
unemployment benefits relative to wages has an influence on the probability of being 
unemployed or on the rate of unemployment. It is generally agreed that there is some 
impact on the duration of unemployment but there is little consensus on the length of 
extended duration. The significance of the effect, in terms of total labour supply, would 
appear trivial. Extended duration does not necessarily correspond with a higher rate of 
unemployment .- where it facilitates a more extensive job search or retraining, 
unemployment m the long run may be reduced. Limiting the duration of benefit 
entitlement has an impact on the length of unemployment spells, but this may be more at 
the expense of participation in the labour force (and serve to disguise the true level of 
unemployment), than actual work activity. 
The labour force participation and work activity of prime age men is least sensitive to 
benefit provision. Teenage men are the most sensitive to the level of benefits and the 
duration of eligibility. It would appear that the labour supply of women, but not men, is 
sensitive to ~e le~~l of family income support. Again, in terms of total work activity, 
the response IS tnvml. The response to the rate of income support withdrawal is not 
certain. Since the empirical link between disincentives in social security programs and 
labour supply is not strong, it does not follow that reduced disincentives to work will 
have a substantial effect on labour supply. Indeed financial considerations are but one 
element in decisions about how much labour to supply. The supposition that individuals 
calculate the financial incentives and disincentives they face and govern their behaviour by 
them is simplistic. Non-financial rewards from working such as stimulation, security, 
companionship and status are as, if not more important, and other economic, institutional, 
social and cultural factors very much bind any individual's decision set. 
We perhaps need to step back and question the reason for the concern over the effects 
of social security provision on labour supply and the rationale for benefit reform. If the 
rationale is to ensure efficient and full use of labour power in the economy, then there is 
no substantial evidence to suggest a need for concern over the impact of benefits on labour 
supply. If, on the other hand, labour supply is the real issue of concern then there are 
other, more effective ways to alter labour supply behaviour. Addressing the demand for 
labour in the economy and opportunities for workers, particularly married women, to 
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supply their labour is one way. Easing constraints imposed by the costs of occupational 
and geographical mobility and the cost and availability of childcare are others. If conce~ 
with labour supply is a means to an end - a means to reduce the number of benefit 
claimants and reduce the fiscal burden of rising unemployment and the rising incidence of 
low pay, then reducing benefits relative to wages will be largely ineffective. 
If, however, the proposed benefit cuts are a means to cut costs in themselves, and not 
intended to have any impact on the work activity of income support recipients or the rate 
or duration of unemployment, then they will be effective. It must be recognised that the 
greatest impact of cuts will be on the consumption levels of beneficiaries, not their labour 
supply behaviour. In the absence of satisfactory state provision, the burden of support 
would fall on family units or private charitable sources. The level and terms of support 
would not be guaranteed and ethically (and politically) undesirable forms of dependence in 
society would be reinstated or accentuated. If the rationale for reform is cost reduction 
then proposed changes should be debated in this context. 
In this paper we have shown that the assertion that disincentives in social security 
programs have substantial effects on actual labour supply appears to be an "economic 
myth".3 Accordingly, attempts to reduce unemployment or poverty by cutting benefits or 
limiting their duration to reduce labour supply disincentives are largely mistaken, and it is 
misleading to present reforms that are essentially cost cutting measures as the solution to 
increasing welfare dependency. 
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